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Energy Policy Act of 2005: Pseudo-Fed for Transmission 
Congestion 
Alexander K. Obrecht* 
ABSTRACT 
Increasing federal involvement in the wholesale electricity market, and 
the ever-important emphasis on renewable energy resources, exposed the 
inadequacies of the existing transmission infrastructure. The Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) attempted to address the transmission problems but 
failed to adequately consolidate federal power over transmission siting. The 
resulting atmosphere presents an unsustainable dichotomy in which federal 
involvement encourages generation dependent upon transmission access, 
while state control over transmission siting impedes the necessary investment 
and capital improvement. Despite the efforts of EPAct 2005, a coherent and 
effective national energy policy remains unobtainable without the ability to 
incentivize generation and guarantee access to transmission by facilitating its 
development across state lines. 
This note proceeds in two sections. First, the background section 
provides a brief history of federally mandated deregulation in the wholesale 
electricity market. A brief summary of EPAct 2005 then explains Congress's 
attempt to encourage transmission investment by allowing limited federal 
jurisdiction over the siting process. Second, the note analyzes the current 
pressures exerted on the transmission grid by renewable energy and 
inadequate state siting processes. The analysis then addresses the judicial 
interpretations of EPAct 2005 and how the United States Courts of Appeals 
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delayed federal jurisdiction over transmission siting for the foreseeable 
future. 
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Historically, the electricity market consisted of vertically integrated 
monopolistic utilities regulated at the state level.1 The Federal Government 
took the first steps in wresting control of the electricity market from the states 
with the deregulation of the wholesale electricity market. 2  Deregulation 
resulted in clashes between monopolistic utilities restricting access to existing 
transmission networks and new non-utility wholesale generators seeking 
access to transmission infrastructure.3  Congress attempted to alleviate the 
clash by passing legislation mandating equal access to transmission capacity.4 
The new transmission capacity demands of the deregulated wholesale 
electricity market exposed the inadequacies and dilapidated condition of the 
existing transmission infrastructure.5 An increasing emphasis on renewable 
energy resources further strains transmission due to the long distances 
electricity must travel from generation to consumption.6 
                                                        
1 See infra notes 12–19 and accompanying text (discussing the early 
development of the electricity industry). 
2  See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text (describing federal 
intervention in the wholesale electricity markets). 
3  See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text (outlining federal 
attempts to mandate open access to transmission). 
4  See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text (discussing federal 
statutes and policies aimed at reducing discrimination in transmission access 
to merchant power producers). 
5 See infra notes 73–101 and accompanying text (describing pressures 
on the transmission infrastructure created by an increase in merchant power 
generator and renewable energy resources). 
6 See infra notes 76–101 and accompanying text (discussing the unique 
pressures of renewable energy resources on the existing transmission 
infrastructure). 
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Federal deregulation of the wholesale electricity market and renewable 
energy development create the need for investment in a nationally focused 
transmission infrastructure. Unfortunately, localities and states retain primary 
control over permitting transmission lines.7 The state siting process impedes 
potential investment by allowing parochial and protectionist policies to 
pander to local concerns, effectively trumping larger regional and national 
benefits of new transmission lines. 8  The dichotomy between federal 
deregulation of the wholesale electricity market and state control of 
transmission siting starved the transmission infrastructure of the necessary 
investment. Accordingly, without federal control of both the wholesale 
market and transmission siting the infrastructure languished under increasing 
congestion, reliability, and security strains.  
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), in part, 
to alleviate the increasing congestion in existing infrastructure by creating 
potential federal authority over transmission line siting.9 However, the attempt 
failed to adequately address the substantial barriers state control creates.10 
Furthermore, judicial interpretations limit EPAct 2005's effectiveness going 
forward.11 Although EPAct 2005 took the correct step to increase federal 
control over the siting process, the program proved woefully inadequate to 
                                                        
7 See infra notes 102–54 and accompanying text (detailing the problems 
with traditional state siting processes for transmission lines). 
8  See infra notes 109–51 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
inadequacies with the state system for transmission line siting and the 
possibility for abuse by state authorities). 
9 See infra notes 55–72 and accompanying text (outlining the provisions 
of EPAct 2005). 
10 See infra notes 102–54 and accompanying text (detailing the problems 
with traditional state siting processes for transmission lines). 
11  See infra notes 160–214 and accompanying text (following the 
judicial interpretations of EPAct 2005 and how the courts have limited any 
potential federal authority). 
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consolidate federal power to modernize the United States' transmission grid. 
The increasingly regional and national electricity marketplace requires federal 
jurisdiction over both wholesale generation and sales and the necessary 
means to modernize the American transmission infrastructure. 
This note proceeds in two sections. First, the background section 
provides a brief history of federally mandated deregulation in the wholesale 
electricity market. A summary of EPAct 2005 explains Congress's attempt to 
encourage transmission investment by allowing limited federal jurisdiction 
over the siting process. Second, the note analyzes the current pressures 
exerted on the transmission grid by renewable energy and inadequate state 
siting processes. The analysis also addresses the judicial interpretations of 
EPAct 2005 and how the United States Courts of Appeals delayed federal 
jurisdiction over transmission siting for the foreseeable future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE ADVENT OF FEDERAL REGULATION IN THE 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
Throughout the twentieth century, the American electric grid developed 
around privately-owned and vertically integrated utilities.12  Locally based 
utilities faced large upfront capital costs to construct generation and 
transmission infrastructure, but after completion, the facilities' operated at 
low cost.13 The inhibitive capital costs made the utility business risky from 
the outset, but provided the potential for rewarding cash flow after the 
                                                        
12 Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line 
Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018 (2009). 
13  THE ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR 
ELECTRIC ENERGY, at 17 (2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-
sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf [hereinafter FERC Competition Study]. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  






P a g e  | 164 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.43 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
 
infrastructure came online.14  Due to the upfront risks, investors sought 
assurances the utility would operate long enough to repay the debt.15 The 
resulting market structure closely resembled a regulated monopoly, in which 
the state granted exclusive generation and transmission rights and assurances 
of an adequate return on investment.16 In return for the exclusive rights, the 
state imposed a duty to serve the customers within the utility's territory.17 The 
model incentivized the utility to expand its transmission network to market its 
own electricity generation, rather than to allow other producers access to the 
grid.18  The monopolistic model provided ninety-five percent of America's 
power needs until problems arose in the 1970s.19 
Changes during the 1970s and 80s created a veritable "perfect storm" of 
economic, political and societal pressure on Congress and individual states to 
question the regulated utility model.20 First, American electricity demand in-
creased 7.5% per year through the end of the 1960s, but costly generation 
improvements gradually began to erode the economies of scale enjoyed 
throughout the early twentieth century.21 The periods of rising inflation and 
interest rates increased the cost of capital to add generation capacity.22 The 
larger generation facilities no longer produced significant decreases in the 
                                                        
14 See id. 
15 Id. 
16 See id. 
17  Id. at 18; see also Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. 
F.E.R.C., 225 F.3d 667, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (addressing the historical nature 
of public utilities and the pressure from current market trends), aff’d sub nom. 
New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
18 Rossi, supra note 12, at 1018. 
19 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 10. 
20 Id. at 19–23. 
21 See id. at 19. 
22 Id. 
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marginal cost of electricity.23  Opponents of the regulated utility model 
criticized the ability of monopolistic utilities to pass inefficient costs to the 
consumer.24 Second, the reliability of the traditional generation model faced 
serious questions. The Arab Oil Embargo inflated fossil fuel prices, which 
squeezed generation margins and raised questions about the availability of 
inputs.25 The 1965 Northeast blackout highlighted the inadequacies of bulk 
power agreements between utilities.26 New environmental regulation threat-
ened traditional methods of generation.27 The Three Mile Island incident in 
1979 created significant regulation of the nuclear sector.28  Finally, social 
sentiment favored a decrease in foreign energy reliance and an increase in 
environmental awareness.29 This "perfect storm," culminated in congressional 
attempts to address the underlying issues.  
Congress reacted to the turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s by increasing 
federal involvement in the energy sector.30 The increased involvement led to 
numerous pieces of legislation addressing energy inputs, wholesale electricity 
generation and industry competition. However, the electricity market did not 
morph dramatically until after the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
                                                        
23 Id. at 19–20. 
24 Id. at 19. 
25 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 20. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 19. 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 See id. 
30  Id.; see Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a 
National Resource Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T No. 3, at 12–13 
(Winter 2005) (discussing the federal government's attempts to coordinate a 
national energy policy, which seemingly caught traction in the 1970s). 
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1978 (PURPA).31  PURPA attempted to increase energy conservation and 
alternative energy sources, while simultaneously decreasing the demand for 
foreign energy.32 PURPA required regulated utilities to interconnect with, and 
potentially purchase power from, nontraditional generation facilities 
classified as qualifying facilities (QFs).33  This provision unintentionally 
opened the door for non-utility owned generators to enter the wholesale 
electricity market.34  Applications for QF status with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) increased from just twenty-nine in 1980, 
representing 704MW, to 979 in 1986, representing roughly 18,000MW, and 
the trend only increased through 1990.35 By 1991, non-utilities owned six 
percent of the electricity generation capacity in the United States.36 PURPA 
marked the beginning of federal involvement in the electricity market 
challenging the traditional state regulated monopoly model. 
Congress took PURPA's authorization of nontraditional generation 
facilities further in passing the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992).37 
EPAct 1992 established a new category of generation facilities completely 
exempt from the regulated monopoly model.38 Entities owning generation 
facilities selling power exclusively in the wholesale market qualified for 
classification as an exempt wholesale generator (EWG).39 The creation of 
                                                        
31  FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 20; Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
32 See FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 20–21. 
33 Id. at 20. 
34 Id. at 21. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 22. 
37 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721–26, 106 Stat. 
2776 (1992) [hereinafter EPAct 1992]. 
38 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 23–24. 
39 Id. at 23. 
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EWGs significantly reduced barriers to non-utilities entering the wholesale 
power market and the advent of non-utilities created a major challenge to the 
existing transmission system.40 The traditional regulated utilities controlled 
access to the transmission infrastructure, effectively blocking the growth of 
EWGs.41 EPAct 1992 established FERC's power to order transmitting utilities 
to carry non-utilities' wholesale power sales, subject to certain conditions.42 
FERC attempted to implement the expanded federal power over wholesale 
transmission, but faced serious procedural constraints to the program's 
effectiveness.43  
Unsatisfied with the effectiveness of EPAct 1992, FERC issued Order 
No. 888 to prevent regulated utilities from abusing their transmission facility 
monopoly.44 FERC cited discrimination and anti-competitive practices from 
                                                        
40 Id. at 23–24; see Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE 
Transmission Corridor Designations & FERC Backstop Siting Authority: 
Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the Development 
of New Transmission Facilities?, 30 ENERGY L.J. 415, 422 (2009) (discussing 
the regulatory changes in 1992 allowing FERC to control some transmission 
decisions on regulated utilities’ infrastructure). 
41 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 23. 
42 Id. at 24; EPAct 1992, supra note 37, at §§ 721–26. EPAct 1992 
sought to ensure that FERC would only issue an order to accommodate 
wholesale transactions if the utility could do so under the conditions that the 
“rates, charges, terms, and conditions” are economically feasible, not 
inconsistent with retail marketing areas, and not a “sham.” EPAct 1992, 
supra note 37, at § 722. 
43 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 24. In general, the orders 
were only on a case-by-case application forcing FERC to engage in a 
cumbersome process without broad application. Id. 
44  Id.; see Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 18 C.F.R. §§ 35 
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the regulated monopolies as the most significant barriers to a competitive 
wholesale electricity market.45 They also initiated further federal intervention 
to advance the deregulation started under PURPA.46 Order No. 888 required 
transmission owners transmitting electricity in interstate commerce to file 
open access transmission tariffs (OATTs) with FERC, thereby forcing public 
utilities to treat wholesale power generators the same as traditional customers 
for transmission access.47 FERC's intervention in electricity generation eroded 
powers to regulate monopolistic utilities that were traditionally delegated to 
the states, but the ineffectiveness of EPAct 1992, Order No. 888 and 
changing market conditions necessitated further federal involvement to best 
serve the ultimate consumers of the electricity.48 
Facing continuing complaints of discrimination in transmission access, 
FERC further attempted to consolidate power over transmission with Order 
No. 2000.49 Order No. 2000 authorized the creation of regional transmission 
organizations (RTOs) to eliminate transmission rate differentials between 
territories, increase regional stability and eradicate any discriminatory 
practices still employed by regulated public utilities.50 Although a step in the 
                                                                                                                              
& 385 (1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 21540–01 (May 10, 1996) [hereinafter Order No. 
888]. 
45 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 24; Order No. 888 at 
21540–01. 
46 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 2, 20, 24. 
47 Id. 
48 See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 418–20 (addressing the 
unprecedented power grab by FERC in Order No. 888). 
49  FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 30; see Regional 
Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 
2000), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 
2000), 18 C.F.R. § 35 (2000), aff’d, Public Utility District No. 1 v. FERC, 
272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Order No. 2000]. 
50 FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 30. 
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right direction, RTOs are voluntary organizations and do not actually own 
any transmission facilities.51 Accordingly, RTOs only reach those markets 
willing to participate. Much of the Southeast, West (excluding California) 
and Midwest appear hesitant to relinquish local control over the process.52 
B. ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 
Upset with the continued frustration of investment and improvement of 
the transmission infrastructure, Congress attempted to further consolidate 
federal authority through the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPAct 2005). Congress passed EPAct 2005 to provide a comprehensive 
national energy policy emphasizing domestic energy production, 
conservation and efficiency to enhance energy security and decrease demand 
for foreign energy.53 To improve efficiency and energy security, EPAct 2005 
sought to enhance electricity transmission, especially the deteriorating 
condition of the transmission infrastructure and the inefficiencies in the 
current siting process.54  The outdated transmission infrastructure required 
billions in investment dollars to ensure adequate reliability, security and 
capacity for the rapidly evolving electricity market.55 Congress found that 
inefficiencies in the traditional state level siting process often led to delays 
and outright rejections of vital interstate transmission projects.56 EPAct 2005 
                                                        
51 Id. at 31. 
52 Id. at 32. 
53 S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 1 (2005); see generally Energy Policy Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) [hereinafter EPAct 2005]. 
54  S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 5 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, at 171 
(2005). 
55  S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 7 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, at 171 
(2005). 
56  S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 7 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, at 171 
(2005). 
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attacked the problem by attempting to increase federal jurisdiction in the 
transmission siting process.57 
Congress recognized the need to assess the capacity, operation and 
reliability of the current transmission grid, highlighted by the massive 
blackouts that struck the Northeast and Midwest in 2003.58  EPAct 2005 
mandated the Department of Energy (DOE), in consultation with states, to 
perform electric transmission congestion studies.59 After considering input 
from the interested parties, DOE may create a national interest electric 
transmission corridor (NIETC) in any geographic area with transmission 
capacity constraints or congestion adversely impacting consumers.60  The 
designation of a NIETC depends on DOE's determination of five factors: 
1) the negative economic effects of overpriced power in the corridor; 2) the 
constraints on growth due to a lack of diversity in electricity supply; 3) it 
serves the energy independence of the United States; 4) it is in the interest of 
national energy policy; and, 5) it furthers national defense.61 
Once DOE designates a NIETC, the potential exists for increased federal 
involvement in the transmission line siting process by creating a federal 
backstop.62 If the state process fails to permit a transmission line project, the 
developer may petition FERC to permit the project in certain limited 
                                                        
57  S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 48 (2005); see Michael Diamond, Note, 
“Energized” Negotiations: Mediating Disputes Over the Siting of Interstate 
Electric Transmission Lines, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 217, 227 (2011) 
(discussing the increase in potential federal jurisdiction over the siting 
process after EPAct 2005). 
58 H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, pt. 1, at 171 (2005). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1) (2010). 
60 Id. at § 824p(a)(2). 
61 Id. at § 824p(a)(4). 
62  See generally id. at § 824p(b) (listing the requirements for FERC 
siting authority); see Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 422. 
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conditions.63  A transmission line developer may petition FERC in five 
circumstances: 1) the state process lacks the authority to permit the project; 
2) the state authority cannot consider the interstate benefits of the project; 
3) the developer is a transmitting utility according to federal law, but does not 
qualify for the same status under state law because the developer does not 
serve end-use customers in the state; 4) the state authority has withheld 
approval for more than one year; or, 5) the state has conditioned its approval 
upon unduly burdensome requirements.64  The FERC permitting process 
creates a federal backstop to the traditional state transmission line siting 
process.65 A federal permit authorizes the use of eminent domain on private 
land to facilitate the construction of the project.66 
In sum, EPAct 2005 created a potential, but limited, federal backstop 
authority to site transmission lines.67  First, the DOE must designate a 
congested area as a NIETC.68 Second, if the state permitting process fails to 
approve a transmission project within a NIETC, the developer may petition 
FERC to permit the project.69 Since the enactment of EPAct 2005, FERC has 
                                                        
63 Id. at § 824p(b)(1). 
64 Id. at §§ 824p(b)(1)(A)–(C). The FERC must also find that: 1) the 
transmission project will be used in interstate commerce; 2) the proposed 
project is consistent with the public interest; 3) the project will significantly 
reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce and protects or 
benefits consumers; 4) the construction is consistent with sound energy 
policy and will enhance energy independence; and, 5) the project will 
maximize the transmission capabilities of existing towers. Id. at 
§§ 824p(b)(2)–(6). 
65 S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 48 (2005). 
66 16 U.S.C. § 824p(e); see also S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 48 (2005). 
67 See S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 49; see generally 16 U.S.C. § 824p. 
68 Id. at § 824p(a). 
69 See generally id. at § 824p(b). 
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received only one siting request, which the company subsequently 
withdrew.70 
III. ANALYSIS 
Increasing federal involvement in the wholesale market and the ever-
important emphasis on renewable energy resources exposed the inadequacy 
of the capacity, security and reliability of the existing transmission 
infrastructure. While EPAct 2005 attempted to address the transmission 
problems, it failed to adequately consolidate federal jurisdiction over 
transmission siting. The resulting atmosphere has presented an unsustainable 
dichotomy in which federal involvement encourages transmission dependent 
generation, while state control over transmission siting impedes the necessary 
development. In sum, a coherent and effective national energy policy remains 
unobtainable without the ability to incentivize generation and guarantee 
access to transmission by facilitating its development across state lines. 
The analysis proceeds by first articulating why the electricity market no 
longer supports state authority over transmission line siting. In particular, this 
note highlights renewable energy resources strain the transmission 
infrastructure more than traditional fossil fuels. Second, the note discusses the 
inefficiencies inherent to the state siting process and its impediment to the 
development of new transmission infrastructure. Finally, the analysis explains 
the judicial limitations placed on EPAct 2005's attempt to expand federal 
authority over transmission siting. 
                                                        
70  See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 57, at 235 (referencing Southern 
California Edison’s (SCE) withdrawn application for FERC siting authority). 
The proposed SCE line only connected two states, but still faced restraints to 
its completion. See notes 108–30 and accompanying text (discussing the 
details of the SCE proposal). 
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A. THE TRANSMISSION SECTOR NO LONGER SUPPORTS STATE 
AUTHORITY 
The 1970s to 2000s were a turbulent time for the electricity sector, with 
significant changes in the regulatory and economic aspects of the 
marketplace. The Federal Government consolidated its power in the 
traditionally state regulated model in an attempt to ensure the functionality of 
a holistic, nationally focused electricity market.71 Federal involvement in the 
wholesale power markets increased electricity generation from non-utilities to 
28.2% of total generation capacity in 2004, while regulated utilities decreased 
from a peak of 97% in 1979 to 63.1% in 2004.72 The increase in non-utility 
wholesale generators dramatically expanded the demand for transmission 
access.73 The now competitive wholesale market, coupled with new pressures 
from renewable energy resources, highlights the inadequacies of the existing 
transmission infrastructure. In order to develop interstate transmission 
infrastructure, the federal government must consolidate federal regulation, not 
only over competition, but over transmission siting as well. 
1. RENEWABLE ENERGY PRESSURES ON THE CURRENT 
TRANSMISSION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Although not necessarily new, renewable energy resources sit at the 
forefront of electricity generation movements.74 Initiatives from the Obama 
Administration and individual states encourage the development and use of 
                                                        
71  See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 419–20 (addressing 
changes in the electricity sector and the beginnings of FERC’s consolidation 
of regulatory power). 
72  FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 35 (major federal 
involvement in the electricity sector was implemented through PURPA, 
EPAct 1992 and Order Nos. 888 and 2000). 
73 Id. at 24–31. 
74 See Diamond, supra note 57, at 217–18 (acknowledging America's 
four decades of struggle for clean, reliable energy). 
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renewable resources to diversify energy dependence and clean energy 
profiles.75  Unfortunately, two major systematic issues with large-scale 
renewable generation prevent its effective use in the marketplace.76 First, the 
geographic locations of the states demanding renewable generation are 
generally distant from the isolated parts of the nation generating the power.77 
Second, due to the distance between supply and demand, the nation requires 
new interstate transmission infrastructure to adequately handle the increase in 
production.78 In effect, the renewable energy mandates create demands upon 
transmission infrastructure, which directly clash with the traditional regulated 
utility model. Increased federal jurisdiction over transmission siting best 
facilitates the infrastructure renewable energy development requires. 
As of January 2012, thirty states and the District of Columbia had 
adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) mandating a certain amount of 
energy generated from renewable resources.79 California sets the trend with 
an ambitious rule requiring electric utilities to derive thirty-three percent of 
generation from renewable resources.80 California's population demands an 
                                                        
75 See id. (discussing various initiatives of the Obama Administration); 
Rossi, supra note 12, at 1017. 
76 See Diamond, supra note 57, at 217–18 (highlighting the geographic 
location of renewable resources generation compared to the location of 
demand); Rossi, supra note 12, at 1017. 
77 See Diamond, supra note 57, at 217–18 (highlighting the geographic 
location of renewable resources generation compared to the location of 
demand); Rossi, supra note 12, at 1017. 
78 See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 421–22 (addressing the 
need for further investment in the nation’s transmission infrastructure). 
79 Id. at 462–63; U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, MOST 
STATES HAVE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (Feb. 3, 2012), http:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850. 
80 See generally U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, MOST 
STATES HAVE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (Feb. 3, 2012), http:// 
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enormous amount of energy, nearly 8.5% of the total consumption in the 
United States.81  Other large metropolitan areas face similar constraints as 
renewable energy resources are located in geographically remote and sparsely 
populated areas.82  Although most transmission of renewable energy must 
cross state lines, intrastate transmission inefficiencies impede renewable 
development as well.83  For example, oil tycoon T. Boone Pickens scaled 
down ambitious plans for the world's largest wind farm in the Texas 
Panhandle because the existing transmission infrastructure made the sale to 
Dallas and Houston economically unfeasible.84 The primary consumers of 
renewable energy are in states and metropolitan markets far from 
geographically remote generation facilities, without new transmission 
infrastructure clean energy cannot reach consumers. 
In addition to the geographic location of renewable energy, the 
stationary characteristics of renewable energy resources further complicate 
the issue.85 Renewable resources, unlike coal and natural gas, depend entirely 
                                                                                                                              
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 (listing the progressive 
renewable portfolio standards set by California). 
81 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, CALIFORNIA (Mar. 15, 
2012), http://www.eia.gov/state/state-energy-profiles-data.cfm?sid=CA# 
Consumption. 
82 Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in 
Power, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87, 96–98 (2012) (listing various metropolitan 
areas that face transmission restrictions to renewable energy resources); see 
also Diamond, supra note 57, at 218 (highlighting the geographic location of 
renewable resources generation compared to the location of demand); Rossi, 
supra note 12, at 1017. 
83  See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 97 (discussing the lack of 
transmission within Texas). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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upon the geographic location for their generation capabilities.86 Generators 
may transport fossil fuels in raw form to power plants close to the load 
demand; but wind turbines cannot be transported to metro San Francisco or 
Chicago in mass scale.87 The best prospects for wind energy generally fall in 
the corridor spanning the Dakotas to North Texas and parts of the Mountain 
West, with attractive offshore potential off the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.88 
Solar and geothermal potential similarly exists in the Mountain West and 
Southwest.89 The fundamental characteristics of renewable energy resources 
create an exigent need for transmission lines to facilitate their development.90 
Conservatively, the United States requires hundreds of miles of interstate 
transmission infrastructure.91 
                                                        
86 Id. 
87 Id.; see Rossi, supra note 12, at 1029 (discussing the need for extra 
transmission infrastructure for North Dakota wind generation to power 
Chicago). 
88 Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 97; U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY NATIONAL 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, WIND RESOURCES AND TRANSMISSION 
LINES (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/images/ 
home_usmap.jpg. 
89 Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 97; U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY NATIONAL 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, GEOTHERMAL RESOURCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/geothermal_  
resource2009-final.jpg; U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY NATIONAL RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LABORATORY, PHOTOVOLTAIC SOLAR RESOURCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map_pv_national_ 
lo-res.jpg. 
90 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 97 (discussing the pressures on the 
transmission grid). 
91 See id. (declaring that hundreds of miles of interstate transmission 
lines will need to be constructed to service RPSs). 
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Improving transmission infrastructure requires capital investment.92 
Unfortunately, investment decreased from roughly $5 billion per year 
between 1974 and 1983 (in 2005 dollars), to a low of $2.5 billion from 1993 
to 1994.93 Investment ticked up to $5.8 billion in 2005, and estimates project 
an increase to $8 billion in the coming years.94  Even if the investment 
projections prove true, these numbers make up a miniscule component of an 
industry with $800 billion in capital and estimations of a further $200 billion 
to be raised between 2009 and 2012.95  
The current market landscape presents an interesting conundrum. 
Federal deregulatory efforts spurred the advent of wholesale power markets, 
which allowed non-utility generators to sell bulk power into a traditionally 
monopolistic market place regulated by the states.96 The increase in wholesale 
power necessitated access to existing transmission lines, which FERC 
addressed by mandating open access.97  Now non-utility generators face 
incentives to invest in renewable energy resources but lack the necessary 
                                                        
92 See ELECTRICITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON IN 
A NEW WORLD 16 (Jan. 2009), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/ 
DocumentsandMedia/adequacy_report_01-09-09.pdf (discussing the lagging 
investment in the transmission) [hereinafter KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON]; 
Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 115 (referencing the stagnation in transmission 
investment). 
93 KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON, supra note 92, at 16; see Swanstrom & 
Jolivert, supra note 40, at 421 (discussing boom and bust in transmission 
investment). 
94 KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON, supra note 92, at 16. 
95 Id. 
96 See FERC Competition Study, supra note 13, at 23–35 (outlining 
federal moves in the electricity markets that have consolidated federal 
jurisdiction). 
97 See id. (discussing EPAct 1992 and Order Nos. 888 and 2000). 
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infrastructure to use the clean energy.98 The state siting process forms the 
primary barrier forcing capital to remain on the sideline.99 Since state control 
impedes interstate transmission infrastructure investment and development, 
increased federal jurisdiction over wholesale markets exposed a major flaw 
with state control over transmission siting. 
2. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH STATE TRANSMISSION 
SITING 
Congress took a much needed, but wholly inadequate step to consolidate 
federal power over transmission siting with EPAct 2005.100 The electricity 
market has morphed into a national patchwork of competitive wholesale 
generators demanding access to and investment in new transmission lines.101 
Investors appear willing to fund new transmission projects, but the state siting 
process creates arbitrary obstacles to interstate investment.102 Three funda-
                                                        
98 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 96–98 (listing various metropolitan 
areas that face transmission restrictions to renewable energy resources); see 
also Diamond, supra note 57, at 217–18 (highlighting the geographic location 
of renewable resources generation compared to the location of demand); 
Rossi, supra note 12, at 1017. 
99  Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 115 (discussing state barriers to 
transmission investment); KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON, supra note 92, at 16–17 
(listing interstate concerns in the siting process). 
100 See generally Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 123–24 (highlighting the 
inadequacies of EPAct 2005). 
101 See generally Drew Thornley, The Federal Government's Authority 
to Site Interstate Electric Transmission Lines: How the Meaning of 
“Withheld” is Withholding Clarity for Transmission Development, 6 TEX. J. 
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 385, 385 (2010–2011) (discussing the aging network 
of transmission lines and the inadequacy of patchwork system). 
102 KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON, supra note 92, at 16)17 (listing interstate 
concerns in the siting process); see, e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 115 
(discussing state barriers to transmission investment). 
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mental problems exist with the state siting process for transmission lines. 
First, most state siting processes include a need determination based on the 
in-state benefits of a transmission project.103 Unfortunately, the geographic 
nature of renewable energy resources and power exporting states in general, 
force transmission lines to cross numerous state lines.104 Second, political 
pressures force state officials to skew a cost-benefit balancing test in a way 
that favors their constituents, often ignoring the greater regional and national 
benefits.105 Finally, the overall state system remains grounded on an outdated 
regulatory model that frustrates innovative and necessary market participation 
from key non-utility players.106 
State siting processes and eminent domain need determinations rarely 
allow state officials to consider regional or national benefits to new 
transmission projects.107 Although some states allow the consideration of out-
of-state benefits, it only takes one intrastate focused siting authority to 
                                                        
103 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 12, at 1019–20 (discussing the basis for 
state need determinations). 
104 See generally Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 96–98 (listing various 
metropolitan areas that face transmission restrictions to renewable energy 
resources); see also Diamond, supra note 57, at 218 (highlighting the 
geographic location of renewable resources generation compared to the 
location of demand). 
105 See generally Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 115–23 (describing the 
various pressures on state officials that are not balanced against the overall 
benefit of the transmission project). 
106 See Matthew J. Agen, Transmission Tug-of-War, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
46, 50–51 (Nov. 2011) (describing the problems the Maryland Public Service 
Commission faced in permitting the Potomac-Appalachian Transmission 
Highline (PATH)). 
107 See Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site 
Without Vision, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 23, at 26–27 (Oct. 2003) (specifically 
referencing Mississippi code as forbidding the state PSC from considering 
out-of-state benefits). 
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impede development.108  The inconsistencies in the individual state siting 
processes effectively Balkanizes a national transmission program.109  For 
example, in 2005, Southern California Edison (SCE) began the process of 
permitting a 225-mile high voltage transmission line from Arizona into 
California.110 The majority of the transmission line was located on existing 
rights-of-way in federally approved corridors, but approval from both the 
California and Arizona Public Service Commissions (PSC) were necessary to 
move forward with the project.111 California approved the line in 2007, but 
Arizona denied the permit.112  The lack of in-state benefits proved key to 
Arizona's denial of the project.113  SCE estimated the project would have 
resulted in $650 million in costs to California ratepayers, but cumulative 
savings of $1.1 billion over the life of the line.114 Arizona ratepayers would 
incur $242 million in costs over the life of the line and an approximate five 
percent increase in spot prices at the Palo Verde hub.115 Arguably, the five to 
one ratio of benefits to the region, compared to the local costs to Arizona, 
                                                        
108 Id. at 26–28; see Thornley, supra note 101, at 385. 
109 See Brown & Daniels, supra note 107, at 26–28; see Thornley, supra 
note 101, at 385 (referencing the patchwork transmission system as an 
effective Balkanization of the grid). 
110  See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 450–52 (discussing 
SCE’s efforts to permit the Devers-Palo Verde 2 line (Devers PV2)); 
Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 116–17 (referencing the SCE line). 
111 See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 450–52 (referencing the 
approvals necessary to permit the project, although SCE claimed the majority 
of it ran through federal rights-of-way). 
112 See Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 451. 
113 See S. Cal. Edison Co., 2007 WL 2126365 1–3 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n 
June 6, 2007) (listing the Arizona PSC’s concerns about the economic, 
reliability and environmental impacts of the new transmission lines). 
114 Id. at 2. 
115 Id. 
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supports the construction of the power line, but the Arizona PSC focused on 
the detriment to their rate base almost irrespective of the regional benefits.116  
In addition to costs, SCE presented estimates of $213 million in net 
benefits to the Arizona ratepayers through increased construction jobs, better 
access to renewable energy and an improvement in the investment climate in 
the area.117 The Arizona PSC dismissed the possible benefits as speculative 
and irrelevant to the factors PSC can weigh under its governing statute.118 
The Arizona PSC might have made the "best" decision for its ratepayers, but 
it did so in a way that completely discounted and ignored the regional 
benefits to the electricity market.119 The attitude of the Arizona PSC can be 
summed up by one commissioner's comment that the Devers-PV2 line 
amounted to nothing more than an "extension cord" to the California power 
sink.120  
Arguably the Arizona PSC made the correct decision, assuming the only 
thing to be considered is the cost of a new transmission line to in-state 
ratepayers.121 The nature of transmission projects produces large benefits to 
regional markets, but creates large costs and negative externalities for states 
and localities.122 The typical economic costs consist of the recovery of the 
upfront investment and a reasonable return on investment, which are borne by 




119 Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 116. 
120 Id.; Paul Davenport, Arizona Regulators Reject New Electric Line to 
California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 30, 2007, http://legacy 
.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20070530-1728-wst-sharingpower.html. 
121 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 110 (describing the problems with 
often regional benefits and local costs of transmission lines). 
122 Id. 
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local ratepayers.123 Continuing with the SCE example, Arizona ratepayers 
faced a substantial increase in their electricity costs, even though the savings 
were predominantly in California.124 A larger emphasis may be placed on 
intrastate environmental and aesthetic concerns.125 High voltage transmission 
lines require a large right-of-way and often stand over 100-feet tall.126 
Understandably, landowners that oppose the construction of transmission 
lines refer to them as aerial junkyards.127 These concerns are not unfounded 
as transmission rights-of-way can result in decreased property values, 
interfere with existing uses and potentially harm local tourism.128 Thus, the 
local costs vest state residents with an interest in combating almost any 
transmission line project, especially ones with predominantly regional 
benefits.129 
                                                        
123 Id. 
124 See S. Cal. Edison Co., 2007 WL 2126365 1–3 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n 
June 6, 2007) (listing the Arizona PSC’s concerns about the economic, 
reliability and environmental impacts of the new transmission lines). 
125 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 111–13 (discussing the eye sore 
transmission lines create and the possible noise disturbances). 
126 Id. at 111. 
127 Id. 
128 See Diamond, supra note 57, at 225–26 (referencing the negative 
impact of transmission lines on property may top a 15% decrease in extreme 
circumstances); Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 112 (stating that affected parties 
are often willing to pay for improved transmission towers with lower 
profiles). 
129  See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 118–20 (discussing the political 
pressures that can be exerted on state siting officials). 
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The political arena provides the logical outlet for public outcry in the 
state transmission line siting process.130 Elected state officials recognize they 
answer only to their constituents, the very same people facing increased costs 
due to a transmission project.131 The affected local groups generally bear a 
higher per capita cost in comparison to the regionally dispersed per capita 
gain.132 The disparity in the per capita allocation creates a situation in which 
local cost bearers are more likely to organize and lobby their political 
representatives than the beneficiaries.133 Even if the regional beneficiaries 
were to organize, no proper political venue exists for their voice to be heard, 
because they cannot vote in the opposing state.134 The current political system 
skews any cost-benefit analysis at the state siting level against the regional 
benefits.135 
These political pressures even arise in intrastate transmission siting.136 
For example, the New York Regional Interconnection (NYRI) sought to carry 
power from upstate New York to the New York City Metropolitan Area.137 
Due to significant congestion in transmission capacity to New York City, 
                                                        
130  See id. (describing political pressures exerted on local and state 
officials). 
131 Id. at 118. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134  See generally id. (recognizing that “Not in My Backyard” 
movements arise at the local and state levels, generally the locations at which 
political control over transmission sittingexists); see Diamond, supra note 57, 
at 226 (referencing NIMBY movements blocking transmission line 
development). 
135 Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 119. 
136  See id. at 117–120 (outlining the struggle to site the New York 
Regional Interconnection). 
137 Id. at 118. 
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millions of consumers were forced to purchase higher priced electricity from 
localized generators.138  The project seemingly had considerable intrastate 
benefits to millions of people, but it faced staunch opposition from certain 
residents along the proposed route.139  Prominent New York politicians 
including Senator Schumer and former Senator Clinton vowed to fight 
against the NYRI project at multiple levels.140 Ultimately, the centralized 
political opposition concentrated among the minority bearing the loss 
overcame the massive benefit to millions of New York residents. 141 
Therefore, even if states have the possibility to consider regional benefits in 
the siting process, the political process coupled with parochial and "not in my 
backyard" (NIMBY) concerns often outweigh the aggregate benefits.142 
Assuming states may properly consider the interstate benefits of 
transmission lines and are not subject to political pressures, many states still 
implement archaic definitions of what type of entity may apply for a 
permit.143 In general, states limit the entities that may apply for transmission 
development to "public utilities," which creates problems for non-utilities 
attempting to site a transmission project through the state.144 For example, 
various entities attempted to permit the Potomac-Appalachian Transmission 
Highline (PATH) carrying power from Pennsylvania and West Virginia to the 
suburbs of Washington D.C. 145  The proposed project spanned 275 miles 
                                                        
138 Id. 




143 See Agen, supra note 106, at 50 (acknowledging that many states 
face constraints on what type of entity may apply for transmission permits). 
144 Id. at 150. 
145 See generally id.; Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 117. 
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through the former Mid-Atlantic Area NIETC.146 The Maryland PSC refused 
to consider the portion of the project running through the state, because the 
PSC could only issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to an 
"electric company."147 The definition of "electric company" reaches back to 
the outdated concepts of regulated monopolies. In order to qualify the 
company must be "a person who physically transmits or distributes electricity 
in the State to a retail electric customer."148 The Maryland PSC found that 
PATH Allegheny Transmission did not qualify as an electric company and 
refused to rule on the permit.149 
The PATH example further highlights the clashing nature of FERC's 
deregulated wholesale market and the traditional state siting process.150 Non-
                                                        
146 Agen, supra note 106, at 50; Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 117; see 
generally California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631 F.3d 
1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (throwing out NIETC designations in the Southwest and 
Mid-Atlantic for failures to consult with local governments and lacking 
environmental analysis). 
147 Agen, supra note 106, at 50; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 1-
101(h) (West 2012). 
148 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 1-101(h). 
149 Agen, supra note 106, at 50; see Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 117 
(discussing resistance to transmission line construction projects). Potomac 
Edison later re-submitted a permit to the Maryland PSC to permit the project, 
which the Maryland PSC accepted because Potomac Edison qualified as an 
electric company while its subsidiary PATH Allegheny Transmission did not. 
Agen, supra note 106, at 50. 
150  As of February 28, 2011 the PATH project was suspended 
indefinitely due to the Mid-Atlantic RTO’s (PJM) desire to further study the 
need for the transmission project. PATH Seeks to Withdraw Application for 
Electric Transmission Project: Regional Grid Operator Directs Suspension 
of PATH Project (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.pathtransmission.com. Notably, 
this suspension came a few days after the Mid-Atlantic NIETC was dissolved 
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utility entities are encouraged to provide competition in the wholesale power 
market and guaranteed access to the woefully inadequate transmission 
infrastructure, but they cannot expeditiously build extra infrastructure to 
improve the problem. The inability for the state transmission siting process to 
consider regional and national benefits, the political pressures to favor 
localized costs and the outdated regulatory models employed by states all 
support the case for stronger federal jurisdiction in the transmission siting 
process.151 Congress attempted to alleviate these concerns with EPAct 2005, 
but failed to effect any meaningful change.152 
B. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS OF FERC'S AUTHORITY UNDER 
EPACT 2005 
FERC's potential backstop authority to site transmission lines occurs 
only within a limited geographic area, and even then, only pursuant to overly 
specific conditions.153  First, DOE must conduct an electric transmission 
congestion study.154 In areas subject to congestion, DOE may designate the 
geographic region as a NIETC.155 If transmission projects in a NIETC are 
unable to obtain the required state siting permits because of undue delay, 
onerous conditions or a lack of authority, then transmission developers can 
                                                                                                                              
by the Ninth Circuit, but the press release does not mention a connection 
between the two events. 
151 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 124–28 (calling for complete federal 
control over transmission line siting). 
152 See id. at 123–24 (acknowledging the woeful inadequacies of EPAct 
2005’s transmission authority); Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 455–
56 (discussing the failure of EPAct 2005 to spur investment in transmission); 
Rossi, supra note 12, at 1033 (questioning how much authority FERC 
actually has under EPAct 2005 after judicial limitations). 
153  See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p(a)-(b) (2012) (listing the requirements in 
order to invoke FERC backstop authority). 
154 See id. at § 824p(a)(1). 
155 See id. at § 824p(a)(2). 
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apply for FERC permitting.156 These overly limiting conditions coined the 
term "backstop" authority for FERC's jurisdiction.157  Nevertheless, EPAct 
2005 attempted to increase, at least the threat of, federal preemption to the 
state siting process.158 
Unfortunately, the judiciary exhibited reluctance to accept FERC's 
newly created authority.159  In California Wilderness Coalition v. United 
States Department of Energy, the Ninth Circuit invalidated DOE's two 
electricity congestion studies, upon which the only NIETCs were based.160 
The rejection of the NIETC designations calls into question DOE's ability to 
designate a geographic area for federal transmission siting authority.161 The 
Fourth Circuit further complicated the issue in Piedmont Environmental 
Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by limiting FERC's 
                                                        
156 See id. at § 824p(b). 
157 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 40, at 415 (referring to FERC’s 
transmission siting authority as “backstop”); Diamond, supra note 57, at 219 
(taking the “backstop” reference to its obvious metaphor, with the 
comparison to the backstop on a baseball diamond). 
158 Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 123–24. 
159 See California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631 
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (throwing out NIETC designations in the 
Southwest and Mid-Atlantic for failures to consult with local governments 
and lacking environmental analysis); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. F.E.R.C., 
558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting FERC authority if a state lawfully 
denies a transmission line project). 
160 See Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1095–96 (vacating congestion 
studies and accordingly, the NIETCs that based upon them). 
161 See Agen, supra note 106, at 49 (noting that the Wilderness Coalition 
case has placed FERC’s jurisdiction in limbo); Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra 
note 40, at 436–40 (referring to the then pending litigation in Wilderness 
Coalition and its potential impacts to any FERC authority). 
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ability to site transmission lines if a state denies approval.162 The practical 
result of the Fourth Circuit's holding severely hinders FERC's potential 
authority.163 Judicial challenges and the courts' opinions dealt EPAct 2005 a 
serious setback by limiting DOE's ability to designate NIETCs and further 
gutting any threat of FERC's "backstop" authority by allowing states to 
circumvent triggering FERC's jurisdiction.164 
1. CONGESTION STUDIES, NIETC DESIGNATIONS, AND 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S WILDERNESS COALITION 
DECISION 
The factual background in the Ninth Circuit's Wilderness Coalition 
decision dates back to the enactment of EPAct 2005. In response to EPAct 
2005 DOE began studying transmission line congestion.165 Pursuant to the 
statutory mandate, DOE was required to "consult with the affected States" in 
completing the congestion study and allow the affected states to comment 
before designating a NIETC.166  To accomplish this end, DOE sought 
                                                        
162 Piedmont, 558 F.3d at 320 (holding that a state’s legal denial of a 
transmission permit does not trigger FERC jurisdiction). 
163  See Thornley, supra note 101, at 396–97 (stating that FERC's 
authority remains an open question). 
164 See Agen, supra note 106, at 49 (noting that the Wilderness Coalition 
case has placed FERC’s jurisdiction in limbo); Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra 
note 40, at 436–40 (referring to the then pending litigation in Wilderness 
Coalition and its potential impacts to any FERC authority); Thornley, supra 
note 101, at 396–97 (stating that FERC’s authority remains an open 
question). 
165  Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1080–81; 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) 
(2012). 
166  Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1080–81; see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824p(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (requiring consultation with the affected States in the 
congestion study and an opportunity to comment as to the possible 
alternatives and recommendations to the designation of a NIETC). 
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comments from the public through a notice on February 2, 2006 and held an 
open technical conference in March 2006.167 No states received an invitation 
to the closed list conference in May 2006.168 The underlying data behind the 
congestion studies was not provided to the states.169 DOE published the final 
congestion study in August 2006 and requested comments on the study and 
the ensuing designation of NIETCs.170 Two major concerns emerged among 
the comments.171 The first category expressed concern that DOE failed to 
"consult" with the states during the congestion studies, contrary to the 
heightened mandate required.172 The second concern addressed DOE's failure 
to conduct the environmental review required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA).173 DOE formally designated two NIETCs on October 5, 
2007, the Mid Atlantic and Southwest Corridors, despite the negative 
comments.174 Unhappy with the procedural aspects of the congestion study 
and both NIETC designations, various environmental groups and states filed 
thirteen petitions for review, which the Ninth Circuit consolidated into one 
case.175 
Petitioners advanced the fundamental arguments expressed in the 
comments, that DOE failed to consult with the affected states and completely 
                                                        
167 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1080–81. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 1089–90. 
170 Id. at 1080–81. 
171 See generally id. at 1081–83 (expressing the comments’ concern that 
DOE did not “consult” with the states and did not conduct the appropriate 
NEPA review). 
172 Id. at 1081–82; 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1) (requiring consultation). 
173 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1082–83; see generally 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321–35 (2012) (codifying NEPA). 
174 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1083. 
175 Id. 
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skipped any NEPA analysis.176  DOE countered they solicited comments 
multiple times and held an open conference for additional conversation.177 
The Ninth Circuit settled on the first prong of the Chevron deference, 
claiming the statutory language unambiguously expressed congressional 
intent that DOE consult with the affected states.178 The court weighed DOE's 
opportunities to comment against the plain meaning and case law 
interpretations of "consultation," coupled with the withheld data underlying 
the congestion studies.179 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held DOE failed to 
meet the heightened standard of consultation, by allowing only an 
opportunity to comment.180 
The court then turned to the crucial issue of whether the failure to 
consult amounted to more than a harmless error.181 The opinion explained 
DOE's conduct adversely affected the congestion study and NIETC 
designations in three ways.182 First, "consultation requires an exchange of 
ideas and opinions before an agency makes a decision" and the comment 
periods failed to allow the same opportunity.183  Second, due to the 
                                                        
176 See generally id. at 1085–107 (following the court’s analysis through 
the consultation and environmental arguments). 
177 Id. at 1085–86. 
178 Id. at 1083–85 (applying Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1) 
(2012) (“the Secretary of Energy . . . in consultation with affected States, 
shall conduct a study of electric transmission congestion”). 
179 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1087–90. 
180 Id. at 1086. 
181 Id. at 1090–95. According to Ninth Circuit precedent, a harmless 
error requires a finding that an error had no impact on the procedure followed 
or the determination’s substance. Id. at 1092. 
182 Id. at 1093–95. 
183 Id. at 1093. 
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discretionary nature of DOE's decision, consultation would have provided an 
effective tool for lobbying by the affected states.184 Third, the court reasoned 
"that consultation would likely have resulted in a different study."185  The 
combination of the three adverse effects resulting from the failure to consult 
culminated in the court's holding that DOE's actions amounted to more than 
harmless error.186 To remedy DOE's failure to consult, the court vacated the 
congestion studies and consequently the NIETC designations for the 
Southwest and Mid-Atlantic Corridors.187 Thus, DOE and FERC were thrown 
back to square one in implementing siting authority under EPAct 2005; the 
Wilderness Coalition decision destroyed nearly six years of work.188 
The Wilderness Coalition court took its holding one step further in 
addressing the petitioner's environmental claims.189 Even though the inade-
quate congestion studies nullified the NIETC designations, the studies would 
have been vacated because of DOE's failure to conduct the proper 
environmental analysis.190 DOE attempted to argue the NIETC designations 
were too speculative to warrant NEPA analysis.191 However, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected DOE's assertions because the conclusory analysis performed by the 
department failed to provide a "hard look" at the potential environmental 
impacts of NIETC designation.192 The court's decision effectively mandated 
                                                        
184 California Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 
1093-95 (9th Cir. 2011). 
185 Id. at 1094–95. 
186 Id. at 1095. 
187 Id. at 1095–96. 
188  Id.; Agen, supra note 106, at 49 (recognizing that Wilderness 
Coalition returned DOE and FERC to the enactment of EPAct 2005). 
189 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1096. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1098. 
192 Id. 
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the completion of an environmental analysis (EA) or environmental impact 
statement (EIS) for every NIETC designation.193 
Wilderness Coalition returns any potential FERC authority over 
transmission siting back to square one.194  DOE must conduct congestion 
studies with a heightened standard of consultation, the contours of which re-
main uncertain.195 FERC's potential authority erodes further because NIETC 
designations require the completion of time consuming NEPA analysis.196 
Thus, the trigger for potential FERC authority will be delayed, possibly by 
years.197 Even if a NIETC were to be designated, it is doubtful that FERC 
will be able to assert jurisdiction contrary to the state's wishes.198 
2. DENIAL OF STATE PERMITTING REQUESTS, 
CIRCUMVENTING FERC JURISDICTION, AND THE 
FOURTH CIRCUIT'S PIEDMONT DECISION 
The Fourth Circuit dealt EPAct 2005 another fatal blow by severely 
limiting the potential for FERC backstop authority over transmission siting. 
                                                        
193 Id. at 1098–106 (finding that NIETC designations are major federal 
actions that raise significant environmental impacts). 
194  See Agen, supra note 106, at 49 (recognizing that Wilderness 
Coalition “returned DOE and FERC to the enactment of EPAct 2005”). 
195 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1081–106; Agen, supra note 106, 
at 49 (analogizing Wilderness Coalition to a complete rejection of 
DOE/FERC authority). 
196 Wilderness Coalition, 631 F.3d at 1081–106; Agen, supra note 106, 
at 49 (stating that FERC authority is in limbo). 
197 See Agen, supra note 106, at 49 (questioning the applicability of 
EPAct 2005 to any transmission line that was before a state PSC before the 
Wilderness Coalition decision). 
198 See id. at 48 (recognizing that FERC authority can be circumvented 
by the state process). 
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Transmission line developers may petition for FERC backstop authority 
within a NIETC if the state PSC lacks the authority to permit the project, 
withholds a decision for more than one year or conditions its approval upon 
overly onerous conditions.199 FERC interpreted a state's denial of a permit to 
trigger the one year withholding period for potential FERC authority.200 
Unhappy with FERC's interpretation, various PSCs and community interest 
groups petitioned for review, with the case being consolidated in the Fourth 
Circuit.201 In Piedmont, the petitioners challenged Order No. 689's interpreta-
tion of "withheld approval" as including the lawful denial of a transmission 
siting request.202 The Fourth Circuit held the plain meaning of "withhold" did 
not include a denial, as withholding implied a continuous act while denial 
was definite and final.203  The court bolstered its adherence to the plain 
meaning of "withhold" in the context of the statute by interpreting FERC's 
potential authority to only be in limited circumstances.204 If the court accepted 
FERC's interpretation, it thought that PSCs would lose jurisdiction, unless 
they approved every siting permit.205  The court could not accept such a 
sweeping grant of federal jurisdiction and overturned FERC's 
interpretation.206 
                                                        
199 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2010). 
200  See, e.g., Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site 
Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, Order No. 689, 18 C.F.R. § 50 
(2006); Agen, supra note 106, at 48 (interpreting FERC Order No. 689). 
201 See generally 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting FERC authority 
if a state lawfully denies a transmission line project). 
202 Id. at 311. 
203 Id. at 313. 
204 Id. at 313–14. 
205 Id. at 314. 
206 Id. at 315. 
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In his dissent, Judge Traxler emphasized the overarching goal of EPAct 
2005 to allow FERC intervention to site transmission lines.207 The dissent 
claimed not equating a denial to withholding approval allows one state to 
derail a multistate line, which EPAct 2005 sought to prevent.208 Under Judge 
Traxler's interpretation, approval of a permit is withheld every day a permit is 
not issued, which continues to run after denial as approval is still withheld.209 
The dissent would accept FERC's interpretation and give effect to the 
underlying congressional intent to expedite transmission line siting.210 
Piedmont created a loophole in FERC's potential jurisdiction.211 If the 
denial of a transmission siting permit does not trigger the one-year 
withholding provision, then a state only needs to legally deny a permit to 
avoid the threat of FERC jurisdiction.212 The Fourth Circuit essentially gutted 
any potential threat of FERC jurisdiction and nullified EPAct 2005's reach to 
only the dullest of PSCs who cannot find a valid reason to deny a 
transmission line siting permit.213 Judicial challenges in the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits severely limited any potential for EPAct 2005 to have a meaningful 
impact on the transmission line siting process. 
                                                        
207 558 F.3d at 323–26 (Traxler, J., dissenting). 
208 Id. at 324. 
209 Id. at 323. 
210 Id. at 325–26. 
211 See Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 124 (recognizing that a state only 
needs to deny approval to circumvent FERC authority). 
212 See, e.g., id.; Agen, supra note 106, at 48; Thornley, supra note 101, 
at 396. 
213 See, e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 82, at 124; Agen, supra note 106, at 
48; Thornley, supra note 101, at 396. 
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Although the threat of federal transmission siting authority may remain 
on the books, this aspect of EPAct 2005 lacks any potential for use in the near 
future. Federal intervention created the first and largest strains on the existing 
transmission infrastructure. Renewable energy resources further burden an 
outdated transmission grid. State control over transmission line siting forms 
the primary obstacle to investment and construction of new lines. To ensure 
regional and national coordination, the federal government must consolidate 
its power over not only transmission access, but transmission siting as well. 
EPAct 2005 attempted to take a step in the right direction, but ultimately 
proved ineffective. As long as the individual states control interstate 
transmission siting, congestion, poor reliability and security, and a dearth of 
investment will plague the United States' transmission grid. 
